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T
he consolidation of the U.S. banking industry has greatly in-
creased the importance of large multi-market banking organiza-
tions relative to smaller, single-market banks. Economists have 
conducted many empirical studies of the effects of this shift, including 
the impact on the competitiveness of banking markets, the volume of 
small business lending, and the safety and soundness of the banking 
system. An issue that has not received as much attention is how multi-
market banking has affected the response of local bank lending to local 
economic shocks. When an area is hit particularly hard by a recession, 
is bank lending now more likely to decline in the area, exacerbating the 
downturn? Or is bank lending now more likely to remain unchanged, 
moderating the downturn? The answer is important to local communi-
ties because it affects the volatility of their output and employment. But 
it is also important to the national economy, because the distribution of 
credit across markets can affect overall productivity and growth.
In principle, the shift to multi-market banking could either increase 
or decrease the sensitivity of bank lending to local economic shocks. On 
the one hand, the ability of multi-market banks to shift funds to offices 
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in other markets could make these banks more prone to reduce local 
lending when a slowdown in the local economy decreases the creditwor-
thiness or credit demands of local borrowers. On the other hand, the 
diversification and capital-market access of multi-market banks could 
make them better able to continue funding local loans when a local 
economic downturn reduces the availability of funds from depositors 
or decreases bank capital. Moreover, while multi-market banks may be 
better able to shift lending from slumping markets to thriving markets, 
two factors could deter them from making such a shift—a greater abil-
ity to cope with increases in the risk of local lending, and a lesser ability 
to identify and react to changes in local economic conditions.
Because the impact of multi-market banking is ambiguous in theory, 
the only way to determine how the sensitivity of bank lending to local eco-
nomic shocks has been affected is to examine the data. Until recently, such 
empirical studies have been hampered by the lack of data on bank lending 
at the local level. In the mid-1990s, a new source of data on local lending 
to small businesses became available as part of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA), a law enacted a decade earlier to encourage banks to lend 
to their local communities. This article uses the new data to examine the 
impact on local lending of the slowdowns in some local economies during 
the 2001 recession and recovery. The basic approach is to see whether these 
slowdowns had a different effect on lending by single-market banks than 
on lending by multi-market banks. The article finds substantial support 
for the view that the shift to multi-market banking has reduced the overall 
sensitivity of bank lending to local economic shocks. The article also finds 
some evidence that this effect may be due to a lesser ability of multi-market 
banks to identify and respond to changes in local economic conditions. 
The first section of the article documents the sharp increase in the 
importance of multi-market banking over the last two decades. The 
second section discusses the different effects that multi-market banking 
could have on the response of bank lending to local economic shocks. 
The next section describes the new CRA data on local lending to small 
businesses and explains why the 2001 recession and recovery provide a 
good opportunity to examine the impact of multi-market banking on 
such lending. The third section describes the specific approach used to 
investigate the impact of multi-market banking and presents the main 
findings. The last section discusses the implications of the findings. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  7
I.   THE SHIFT TO MULTI-MARKET BANKING
The U.S. banking industry has undergone significant consolidation dur-
ing the last three decades. The merger wave began in the 1980s, as barriers 
to geographic expansion were gradually relaxed (Chart 1). At the beginning 
of the period, some states still prohibited banks from operating branches 
throughout the state, and some even prohibited bank holding companies 
from acquiring additional banks in the state. In addition, all states banned 
acquisition of banks by out-of-state holding companies. By the early 1990s, 
most of the states that had restricted intrastate expansion had dropped those 
restrictions, and almost all 50 states had passed new laws permitting acquisi-
tions of banks by out-of-state companies. Such deregulation led to a gradual 
increase in merger activity, with the volume of assets acquired in bank merg-
ers rising from $10 billion in 1980 to over $160 billion in 1992.
The process of geographic deregulation culminated with the passage 
by Congress of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. This act not only authorized 
out-of-state acquisition of banks in all states but also allowed banks to op-
erate out-of-state branches. Thus, for the first time, multi-bank holding 
companies with separately incorporated banks in different states were able 
to merge the banks into a single institution with out-of-state branches.1 
Most banking companies viewed out-of-state branches as more efficient 
and cost effective than out-of-state bank subsidiaries. Thus, even though 
most states already allowed acquisitions of banks by out-of-state compa-
nies, the Riegle-Neal Act made interstate mergers among banking compa-
nies more attractive, contributing to the surge in merger activity in Chart 
1 in the second half of the 1990s. Although not shown in the chart, the 
authorization of interstate branching also led to a surge in intracompany 
mergers—in particular, mergers among banks belonging to the same hold-
ing company but headquartered in different states.
An important effect of the merger wave has been a sharp increase in 
the importance of multi-market banking—the concentration of bank-
ing activity in geographically dispersed organizations with operations in 
multiple markets. The first three columns of Table 1 provide three alter-
native measures of this shift toward multi-market banking for the period 
from 1990 to 2007. Examples are provided in the accompanying box. 
The data are for metropolitan areas, which the Census Bureau defines as 
areas with a central city of at least 50,000 people.28  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
Chart 1
ASSETS ACqUIREd IN BANk ANd THRIfT MERgERS, 
1980-2003
Note: Excludes mergers among banks and thrifts in the same holding company.
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Offices located 




in a different 
market than 
bank HQ  
Offices located 
in a market with 
less than half of 
org. deposits  
Subordinate 
offices (those 
meeting all  
three conditions)
1990  38.8  20.2  46.7  19.3
1995  48.3  27.5  55.4  26.1
2000  55.0  42.0  60.8  39.0
2005  57.6  52.4  66.4  45.5
2007  60.1  54.5  69.8  45.9
Total change  
(percentage points)  21.4  34.3  23.1  26.6
Note: data are for commercial banks and thrifts. The Census Bureau’s 2003 definitions for metropoli-
tan areas are used for the entire period.
Source: Summary of deposits, National Information Center database 
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MEASURES Of MULTI-MARkET BANkINg
The three different measures of multi-market banking in 
Table 1 can be best explained by example. Suppose that XyZ 
Bancorp, based in Charlotte, North Carolina, owned a sepa-
rately incorporated bank, ABC Bank, based in kansas City, 
Missouri. Then ABC’s offices in kansas City would be located 
in the same market as the bank’s headquarters (kansas City) 
but a different market than the organization’s headquarters 
(Charlotte). As a result, the deposits of ABC Bank’s branches 
in kansas City would be included in the first column of Table 
1 but not the second. 
Suppose next that XyZ Bancorp owns another bank, XyZ 
Bank, also based in Charlotte, North Carolina, and decides to 
merge ABC Bank into XyZ Bank. Then, after ABC Bank be-
came a branch of XyZ Bank, the kansas City offices that XyZ 
Bank acquired from ABC Bank would be located in a differ-
ent market than both the bank’s headquarters (Charlotte) and 
the organization’s headquarters (also Charlotte). As a result, the 
deposits of XyZ Bank’s newly acquired offices in kansas City 
would be included in both the first and second columns of 
Table 1. If these deposits also represented less than half of XyZ 
Bancorp’s total U.S. deposits, then they would be included in 
the third column as well. In this case, XyZ Bank’s newly ac-
quired offices would satisfy the definition of subordinate of-
fices used in this article.
Consider finally the deposits in the Charlotte offices of 
XyZ Bank. These offices would be located in the same mar-
ket as both the bank and the organization. As a result, the de-
posits would not be included in the first or second column of 
Table 1. If the deposits accounted for less than half of XyZ 
Bancorp’s total U.S. deposits, they would be included in the 
third column. However, the Charlotte offices of XyZ Bank 
would still not meet the definition of subordinate offices, due 
to their location in the same market as the bank and organiza-
tion headquarters.10  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
The three measures of multi-market banking are all based on the 
deposits held at home and branch offices of banks and thrifts, because 
these data are the only data on local banking activity available over an 
extended period of time. The first column of the table shows the per-
cent of total metro-area bank and thrift deposits held in offices located 
outside the market in which the organization is headquartered. In this 
article, organizations are defined as bank or thrift holding companies 
and independent banks or thrifts. In contrast, the second column shows 
the percent of total metro-area deposits held in offices located outside 
the market in which the bank is headquartered (the term “bank” is of-
ten used in this article to refer to both commercial banks and thrifts). 
The third column of the table shows the percent of deposits held in 
offices located in markets that are not a dominant source of deposits 
for the organization. In many cases, for example, the home office of a 
large multi-market banking organization will hold only a small fraction 
of the organization’s total deposits. The deposits of these home offices 
would usually be included in the third column of Table 1, but not the 
first and second columns. 
The three measures in Table 1 represent three different aspects of 
multi-market banking, each of which could affect the response of small 
business lending to changes in local economic conditions. An increase in 
the share of deposits held outside banking organizations’ home markets 
indicates a lengthening of managerial lines of control between holding 
companies and their banking offices. To the extent lending decisions 
are made at the holding company level, such a change in organizational 
structure could reduce the response of small business lending to changes 
in local economic conditions. Similarly, an increase in the percent of 
deposits held outside banks’ home markets represents a lengthening of 
managerial lines of control between banks and their branches. If many 
lending decisions are made at the bank level, such a change in organiza-
tional structure could also limit the response of small business lending 
to changes in local economic conditions. finally, the percent of deposits 
held in markets with less than half of an organization’s total deposits pro-
vides a more direct measure of geographic diversification in banking. The 
higher this measure, the less vulnerable banking organizations should be 
to local shocks to deposits, loan demand, or borrower creditworthiness.Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  11
All three measures of multi-market banking show a sharp increase 
in multi-market banking from 1990 to 2007. The share of metro-area 
deposits outside organization headquarters rose from 38.8 percent in 
1990 to 60.1 percent in 2007, an increase of 21 percentage points. The 
share of deposits located in markets with less than half of organiza-
tion deposits increased by a similar amount, rising 23 percentage points 
from 1990 to 2007. However, the biggest change was in the share of 
deposits located outside bank headquarters. This measure rose from 
only 20.2 percent at the start of the period to 54.5 percent at the end, 
an increase of 34 percentage points. Not surprisingly, the measure rose 
by a particularly large amount from 1995 to 2000, when the Riegle-
Neal Act led many multi-state banking organizations to convert their 
out-of-state banks to out-of-state branches of the lead bank. 
The last column in Table 1 reports the overall measure of multi-
market banking that will be used in the remainder of the article—the 
percent of deposits in “subordinate” offices. These are offices located 
in a different market than both the organization headquarters and the 
bank headquarters and in a market accounting for less than half of the 
organization’s total deposits. The term “primary” offices will be use to 
refer to all other offices—those located in the same market as the or-
ganization or bank headquarters or in a market accounting for at least 
half of the organization’s total deposits. Like the first three measures of 
multi-market banking, the share of metro-area deposits in subordinate 
offices increased sharply over the period. Specifically, the deposit share 
of such offices rose from 19.3 percent in 1990 to 45.9 percent in 2007, 
with half of the increase occurring in the second half of the 1990s.
II.  HOW MULTI-MARKET BANKING COULD CHANGE 
THE RESPONSE OF BANK LENDING TO LOCAL ECO-
NOMIC SHOCKS
There are several ways the increase in multi-market banking docu-
mented in the previous section could affect the responsiveness of bank 
lending to local economic shocks. As noted in the introduction, the net 
result could be to make lending to small businesses either more sensi-
tive to local shocks or less sensitive. A useful way to categorize such 
shocks is according to whether they affect the supply of loans by banks 12  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
(supply-side shocks) or the demand for loans and creditworthiness of 
borrowers (demand-side shocks).
supply-side shocks. Some economists have noted that the spread of 
multi-market banking could make bank lending less responsive to those 
local economic shocks that reduce banks’ ability to supply loans. Ex-
amples of such shocks include a decrease in local incomes that reduces 
the availability of funds from local depositors, or an increase in local 
loan losses that reduces the amount of capital that banks have to support 
their lending. Large multi-market banks tend to have greater geographic 
diversification and greater access to capital markets than small single-
market  banks. The  geographic  diversification  of  multi-market  banks 
helps protect them from unusually large loan losses and deposit declines 
in some of the markets in which they operate. faced with such shocks, 
single-market banks in these markets may be forced to sharply curtail 
their lending. In contrast, a multi-market bank may be able to maintain 
lending in these markets. first, the bank’s overall capital may not decline 
very much if loan performance in other markets remains strong. And 
second, the bank may be able to offset the loss of deposits in slumping 
markets by shifting funds from the other markets in which it operates. 
Because of their greater diversification and size, multi-market banks also 
tend to enjoy greater access to capital markets. This ability to raise funds 
on capital markets is another factor making it easier for multi-market 
banks to maintain lending in markets hit by unexpected declines in de-
posits or capital-depleting increases in loan losses.3 
Demand-side shocks. As explained above, the geographic diversifica-
tion of multi-market banks tends to make their lending less sensitive to 
local supply shocks. But geographic diversification can also make lend-
ing of these banks more responsive to local demand shocks—those that 
reduce local borrowers’ creditworthiness or demand for loans. When 
such shocks reduce the expected profitability of local lending, multi-
market banks will generally find it easier than single-market banks to 
shift their lending to other markets in which the expected profitability 
of lending has remained unchanged or increased. To be sure, single-
market banks may respond to a decrease in the expected profitability 
of local lending by shifting into other earning assets, such as govern-
ment securities. But these banks are not likely to reduce local lending as 
much as multi-market banks that have the additional option of lending Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  13
in other markets.4 Another reason single-market banks may not reduce 
lending as much as multi-market banks in response to adverse demand-
side shocks is that they have put more effort into developing long-term 
relationships with local business customers. By continuing to lend to 
such a customer during hard times, a bank can help preserve its invest-
ment in the relationship.5 
While lending by multi-market banks is usually viewed as more 
responsive to local demand-side shocks, two factors could cause their 
lending to be less responsive to such shocks. In some cases, the most 
important effect of a downturn in the local economy may be to increase 
the risk of local lending—that is, the variability of the return to such 
lending. Multi-market banks may be better able to tolerate such an 
increase in local risk than single-market banks, because multi-market 
banks can offset losses in one market with profits in other markets. As a 
result, multi-market banks may be less prone than single-market banks 
to respond to the increase in risk by reducing lending in the market.6 
Another, quite different reason why multi-market banking orga-
nizations may be slower to adjust their lending to adverse demand-
side shocks is that they are less attuned to the local economy than 
single-market banks. Some economists argue that large multi-market 
banks are not well suited to collecting “soft” information about busi-
ness borrowers, such as information about the borrower’s character.7 
Instead, these banks tend to rely on “hard” information, such as finan-
cial statements or credit scores. This reliance on hard information may 
make multi-market banks less able than single-market banks to detect 
a decline in the creditworthiness of local borrowers.8 The hierarchi-
cal structure of large multi-market banks may also make it harder for 
these banks to react quickly to changes in local economic conditions 
than a single-market bank whose loan officers report directly to the 
head of the bank.9    
III.  A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE RESPONSE 
OF BANK LENDING TO LOCAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS
The 2001 recession is the first economic contraction in the United 
States for which comprehensive data have been available on small busi-
ness lending at the local level. The new data, which are collected as part 
of the Community Reinvestment Act, are unique in that they identify 14  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
both the bank making the loan and the location of the business receiv-
ing the loan. The 2001 recession provides a good opportunity to use 
the new data to test opposing views about multi-market banking by 
comparing small business lending at different types of banks in the 
markets most affected and least affected by the downturn. This section 
first describes the new data and then provides background on small 
business lending during and shortly after the 2001 recession. 
new data on small business lending at the local level 
In 1996, regulators began requiring banks to report the geographic 
distribution of their small business lending as part of the Community 
Reinvestment Act, a law enacted a decade earlier to encourage banks 
to meet the credit needs of their communities (Bostic and Canner). 
from 1996 through 2003, all banks and thrifts were required to file 
these reports if they had assets of at least $250 million or were owned 
by a holding company with assets of $1 billion or more. After 2003, the 
size threshold for independent institutions was increased from $250 
million to $1 billion to ease the reporting burden on smaller institu-
tions.10 In 2003, the last year the smaller size threshold was in effect 
for both banks and thrifts, about 1,640 banks and 470 thrifts filed 
reports. According to independent call report data, these institutions 
accounted for almost four-fifths of the total volume of small business 
loans outstanding in June of that year (federal financial Institutions 
Examination Council 2004). 
Under the CRA regulations, banks and thrifts are required to report 
all gross originations of small business loans during the year.11 gross 
originations are defined to include extensions of new loans, granting 
of new credit lines, and refinancings of existing loans. Small business 
loans are defined as business loans under $1 million in size.12 They in-
clude both commercial and industrial (C&I) loans and loans secured 
by nonresidential real estate.13 Most important for purposes of this arti-
cle, CRA reporters are required to indicate the specific location of each 
small business loan that they originate. This can be either the census 
tract in which the borrower’s headquarters are located, or the census 
tract in which the proceeds of the loan are mainly to be used. 
The CRA data on small business lending are the first data on 
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branching, a banking organization’s total business lending at the state 
level could be calculated from call reports—financial reports that all 
banks and thrifts are required to file with regulators at the end of each 
quarter. However, in states that allowed intrastate branching, call report 
data could not be used to measure business lending at the metro level. 
Also, before 1993, business loans were not broken down by size in the 
call report, making it impossible to distinguish small business loans 
from large business loans. After interstate branching began to spread 
in the second half of the 1990s, call report data could not even be used 
to identify a banking organization’s business lending at the state level, 
because banks reported only their total loans in all states. 
The new CRA data helped fill this gap by providing an annual 
measure of bank lending to small businesses in narrowly defined geo-
graphic areas. The data do have the disadvantage of excluding origina-
tions by smaller banks and thrifts—those independent institutions with 
less than $250 million in assets. Also, because only gross originations are 
reported (that is, loan repayments are not subtracted), the data do not 
provide an exact measure of the change in small business loans in each 
location. despite these limitations, the CRA data on small business 
lending represent an important advance over previous data, allowing 
researchers to compare the response of small business lending to local 
economic shocks at different types of banks.
small business lending in the 2001 recession and recovery
for the nation as a whole, bank loans to businesses typically grow 
slower during economic contractions. Chart 2 shows year-over-year 
growth in commercial and industrial (C&I) loans by U.S. banks since 
the early 1970s. In almost every recession shown, C&I loan growth 
peaked just before the start of the recession, fell during the recession, 
and did not turn back upward until after the recession had ended and 
recovery was under way. 
Economists attribute this tendency for business loan growth to 
slow during and immediately after a recession to the same kinds of 
supply-side and demand-side shocks discussed in Section II. On the 
demand side, many businesses experience slower growth in sales dur-
ing economic contractions, reducing their demand for credit to finance 
inventory accumulation and investment in new plant and equipment. 16  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
The slowdown in sales also reduces businesses’ profits. This decline 
in profits makes it harder for businesses to repay their loans, decreas-
ing the attractiveness to banks of new lending. On the supply side, an 
economic contraction can also make it harder for banks to fund loans 
to businesses. declines in employment and income usually reduce the 
public’s demand for deposits, which many banks depend on as a source 
of funds. In addition, decreases in incomes and profits may cause more 
consumers and businesses to default on their existing loans, reducing 
the capital that banks have available to support their lending.
In principle, these shocks to loan demand and loan supply during an 
economic contraction should affect lending to both small businesses and 
large businesses. Until recently, there was not sufficient data to say for sure 
whether an economic contraction affected lending to small businesses more 
than bank lending to large businesses. However, from data that banks be-
gan reporting to regulators in 1993 on their business loans outstanding by 
size of loan, it is possible to separate out the effect of the 2001 recession on 
small business lending from the effect on large business lending. 
chart 2
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Chart 3 compares growth of small and large C&I loans at all U.S. 
banks. As in the CRA data on small business lending, small loans are 
defined as those under $1 million in size, while large loans are defined 
as those over that amount. The chart confirms that growth in both 
small and large C&I loans fell during and after the 2001 recession, 
implying that the slowdown had the expected negative effect on both 
small and large business lending. The chart also shows that growth in 
small business loans slowed less than growth in large business loans. 
The smaller decline in small business loan growth is consistent with 
other evidence that the 2001 recession had a milder-than-usual ef-
fect on small businesses.14 for the purposes of this study, however, 
the important point is that growth in small business loans did decline 
during and immediately after the 2001 recession. This fact suggests 
that insight into the impact of multi-market banking can be gained 
by comparing the change in small business loan growth at different 
types of banks in the markets most affected and least affected by the 
economic downturn.15 
chart 3
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IV.  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
does the behavior of CRA loan originations during and after the 
2001 recession suggest that multi-market banking is changing the re-
sponse of small business lending to local economic shocks? This section 
first explains the method used to answer this question and then pres-
ents the results.
using the cRa data to investigate the impact of multi-market banking
To determine if multi-market banking has changed the response 
of small business lending to local economic shocks, this article uses a 
“differences-in-differences” approach. The idea is to calculate the dif-
ference in loan growth between the markets most affected and least 
affected by the 2001 recession and then see if this difference in loan 
growth is greater for one type of banking office than the other. 
Distinguishing between different types of offices. It was noted earlier 
that the growth of multi-market banking has been reflected in a sharp 
increase in the importance of subordinate banking offices relative to 
primary offices. Subordinate offices, it will be recalled, are those located 
in a different market than both the bank and organization headquarters 
and in a market accounting for less than half of the organization’s de-
posits. Primary offices consist of all other offices—those located in the 
same market as the bank or organization headquarters or in a market 
accounting for at least half of the organization’s deposits. The impact 
of multi-market banking will be assessed by comparing the effect of 
slower economic growth on growth in loan originations at these two 
types of offices.16 
Calculating growth in loan originations. To calculate growth in origi-
nations at subordinate and primary banking offices in each market, the 
data first had to be adjusted for several factors that could artificially 
boost such growth. These factors include nonreporters becoming re-
porters, reporters merging with nonreporters, and reporters merging 
with each other. The originations data for each reporter were adjusted 
for these factors using the methods described in the appendix.17 The cur-
rent and previous-year originations of each reporter were then summed 
by market and type of banking office in the current year (subordinate 
vs. primary). The final step was to use this data to calculate the year-Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  19
over-year growth in originations for each market, each type of banking 
office, and each year during the 2001 recession and recovery. 
Distinguishing between markets with high and low economic growth. 
The 2001 recession and recovery are commonly defined to include the 
years 2001, 2002, and 2003.18 Chart 4 shows that the slowdown affected 
the 361 metropolitan markets in the U.S. quite differently. At one ex-
treme, 83 metro areas suffered a total drop in employment greater than 
2 percent from 2000 to 2003. But at the other extreme, 81 metro areas 
enjoyed a total employment gain of more than 4 percent over the peri-
od.19 To isolate the effect of slowing economic growth on growth in loan 
originations, the 361 metro markets were divided into two groups—the 
“low-growth” markets, in which 2000-2003 employment growth was 
below the median of 0.74 percent, and the “high-growth” markets, in 
which 2000-2003 employment growth was above 0.74 percent. 
for each market and each type of banking office for which data 
were available, total 2000-03 growth in loan originations was com-
puted by summing the year-over-year growth in originations for 2001, 
2002, and 2003.20 Total 2000-03 growth in deposits was computed 
Chart 4
dISTRIBUTION ACROSS METRO AREAS Of PERCENT 
CHANgE IN EMPLOyMENT, 2000-2003  
Note: Employment is wage and salary employment plus proprietors employment.
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the same way. for each type of banking office, growth in employment, 
deposits, and originations was then averaged across all low-growth mar-
kets for which data were available and across all high-growth markets 
for which data were available. These numbers are reported in Table 2. 
for each type of banking office, Table 2 also indicates the number of 
high-growth markets and the number of low-growth markets for which 
2000-03 growth in deposits and originations could be computed.21 
What the CRA data show about the impact of multi-market banking
The main finding from the 2000-03 data is that slow growth in the 
local economy was associated with lower growth in loan originations 
at primary banking offices, but not at subordinate banking offices. The 
top three rows of Table 2 show that at subordinate banking offices, 
deposit growth was 2.0 percentage points lower in markets with low 
job growth than in markets with high job growth. This result is con-
sistent with the idea that the supply of local deposits varies with local 
income. However, growth in loan originations at subordinate offices 
was virtually the same in markets with low job growth as markets with 
high job growth. The next three rows of the table show that slower eco-
nomic growth was also associated with lower deposit growth at primary 
banking offices—1.4 percentage points. But in contrast to subordi-
nate banking offices, slower economic growth was also associated with 
significantly slower growth in loan originations at these offices—5.4 
percentage points. Thus, slower economic growth had a much bigger 
effect on growth in small business loan originations at primary offices 
than at subordinate offices. As indicated in the last row, the difference 
in differences is 5.2 percentage points, which is both large and statisti-
cally significant.22 
The different lending response at the two types of offices supports 
the view that multi-market banking decreases the sensitivity of bank 
lending to local economic shocks. As noted in Section I, the shift to 
multi-market banking has been reflected in a sharp increase in the im-
portance of subordinate banking offices relative to primary offices. But 
Table 2 implies that small business lending is less responsive to local 
economic shocks at subordinate offices than primary offices. Thus, the 
net effect of the shift to multi-market banking should be to reduce the 
overall sensitivity of small business lending to local economic shocks.Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  21
some further questions 
Table 2 yields important insights into the impact of multi-market 
banking on local bank lending, but it also leaves some important ques-
tions unanswered. Chief among these are the direction of causation 
between local employment growth and local loan growth, the effect of 
organization size on the results, and the relative roles of proximity to 
headquarters and share of organization deposits. 
Could causation run from increased lending by primary offices to small-
er declines in local economic growth? In the discussion of Table 2, it was 
assumed that employment growth in each market could be treated as 
exogenous, in the sense of being uninfluenced by growth in small busi-
ness loan originations. There is, however, an alternative interpretation 
of the positive relationship between local employment growth and local 
table 2
gROWTH IN dEPOSITS ANd SMALL BUSINESS LOAN 
ORIgINATIONS, 2000-2003
(By type of banking office)
 
Average  
job growth  
Average growth 
in deposits  
Average  growth in 
CRA originations 
Subordinate banking offices      
Markets with high job growth (179)  4.3  3.7  11.1
Markets with low job growth (179)  -2.3  1.7  10.9
difference (percentage points)  6.6  2.0***  0.2
Primary banking offices     
Markets with high job growth (116)    4.0  8.6  14.9
Markets with low job growth (132)  -2.4  7.2  9.5
difference (percentage points)  6.4  1.4*  5.4***
Difference in differences    -0.6  5.2***
Note: Subordinate banking offices are offices located in a different market than both bank and orga-
nization headquarters and in a market accounting for less than half of the organization’s total deposits. 
Primary offices are all other offices. The growth rates in the table are arithmetic averages across markets 
of the cumulative 2000-2003 growth rates. for each market, the cumulative 2000-2003 growth rate is 
the sum of the annual growth rates expressed in log form (100 x difference in log levels). Observations 
on a market and type of banking office are included only if the growth in originations is available for 
all three years. for each market and year, organizations with extreme positive or negative growth rates 
for CRA originations are omitted from the data. data are for metro areas only. See text for further 
details.
* Significant at 10 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level 
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loan growth at primary offices. According to this alternative view, lend-
ing by primary offices is especially beneficial to local economic growth, 
because banks that operate primarily in one market are better able to 
identify creditworthy borrowers in that market. As a result, markets in 
which single-market banks decreased lending relatively little in 2000-
03 suffered relatively small declines in employment in 2000-03. 
This alternative interpretation of the results in Table 2 was investi-
gated by using a different measure of local employment growth that is 
more likely to be exogenous with respect to local lending to small busi-
nesses. This measure is employment growth at very large businesses—
specifically, those with at least 500 employees. Such businesses sell pri-
marily to customers outside the local markets in which they are based. 
As a result, their output and employment are unlikely to be affected by 
changes in lending to small businesses in the same market. However, 
job growth at large businesses can have a substantial impact on the 
availability of deposits in the market through its effect on local income 
growth. And job growth at large businesses can have a significant effect 
on the vitality of small businesses in the market through spillover ef-
fects. Thus, job growth at large businesses can serve as a good proxy for 
local supply and demand shocks affecting banks’ small business lend-
ing decisions, without itself being influenced by those decisions. When 
this alternative measure of employment growth was used, the results in 
Table 2 were similar, though not as statistically significant.23 Thus, the 
results in Table 2 appear to reflect causation from changes in local eco-
nomic growth to changes in small business lending at primary offices, 
rather than the other way around.
How much of the difference between primary and secondary offices is 
due to the larger size of multi-market organizations? Multi-market bank-
ing is much more prevalent among large banking organizations than 
small ones. As a result, subordinate offices tend to belong to larger or-
ganizations than primary offices. In 2000, for example, 64 percent of 
deposits at subordinate offices were in banking organizations over $50 
billion in size, while only 32 percent of deposits at primary offices were 
in banking organizations that large. This raises the question whether 
Table 2 is mainly capturing the effect of organization size on local lend-
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One way to test this idea is to perform the calculations in Table 2 for 
different size groups and see if local lending is still more responsive to lo-
cal economic conditions at primary banking offices than at subordinate 
offices. Banking organizations were divided into three size groups—less 
than $10 billion in total assets, $10 to 50 billion in total assets, and 
greater than $50 billion in total assets (constant 2000 dollars). The com-
parison between primary and subordinate offices in Table 2 was then 
repeated for each of the three size groups. The results were very similar 
to those in Table 2. for example, for organizations under $10 billion in 
size, the difference in loan growth between markets with high job growth 
and markets with low job growth was 4.9 percentage points at primary 
offices, but -0.3 percentage points at subordinate offices. The difference-
in-differences between the two types of offices was therefore 5.2 percent-
age points, a large and statistically significant amount. Thus, the marked 
difference in lending behavior between primary and subordinate offices 
in Table 2 does not appear to be due to differences in the size of the or-
ganizations to which the two types of office belonged. 
Which difference between primary and subordinate offices is more im-
portant to the results—proximity to headquarters or share of organization 
deposits? According to the definition used in this article, primary offices 
can differ from subordinate offices in two possible ways—by being lo-
cated in the same market as bank or organization headquarters, or by 
being located in a market that accounts for more than half of organiza-
tion deposits. Either factor could account for the observed difference in 
lending behavior between primary and subordinate offices. A primary 
office located in the same market as bank or organization headquarters 
could enjoy more autonomy in lending decisions, allowing it to re-
spond more quickly to changes in local demand shocks than a typical 
subordinate office. But a primary office located in a market with more 
than half of organization deposits would also be less able to draw on 
offices in other markets for support, making it more vulnerable to local 
supply shocks than a typical subordinate office. 
One way to establish which difference between primary and subordi-
nate offices is more important is to distinguish between two types of pri-
mary offices. first are offices located in the same market as the bank or 
organization headquarters, but in a market accounting for less than half of 
the organization’s total deposits. Most of these offices are the home offices of 24  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
banks belonging to organizations that operate in many markets. Second are 
offices located in the same market as the bank or organization headquarters 
and in a market accounting for more than half of the organization’s total 
deposits. Most of these offices are the home offices of banks in organizations 
operating primarily in one market.24 
for subordinate offices and each type of primary office, Table 3 
reports the same key measures as in Table 2. Specifically, the table shows 
the difference in average job growth, average deposit growth, and aver-
age loan growth between two groups of markets—those with high job 
growth and those with low job growth. The first row shows these mea-
sures for subordinate offices and is identical to the third row in Table 
2. The next two rows report the measures for the two types of primary 
offices. finally, the last three rows of the table show the differences-in-
differences for each pair of office types. 
Table 3 suggests that proximity to headquarters is the main reason 
why small business lending is more responsive to local economic shocks 
at primary offices than subordinate offices. The second and third rows 
show that slower economic growth actually had a somewhat smaller ef-
fect on loan growth at the second type of primary offices (those located 
in markets with more than half of organization deposits) than at the first 
type (those located in markets with less than half of organization de-
posits). Specifically, the difference in loan growth between markets with 
high job growth and markets with low job growth was 5.7 percentage 
points for the second type of primary office, versus 6.4 percentage points 
for the first type. Thus, among offices located close to bank or organiza-
tion headquarters, being in a market with a large share of organization 
deposits did not make lending more responsive to local economic shocks. 
furthermore,  the  first  and  second  rows  show  that  slower  economic 
growth had a much bigger effect on loan growth at the first type of pri-
mary office than at subordinate offices—6.4 percentage points versus 0.2 
percentage points.25 Thus, among offices located in markets with a small 
share of organization deposits, being close to bank or organization head-
quarters did make lending more responsive to local economic shocks. 
Taken together, the results suggest that lending is more responsive to 
local economic shocks at primary offices mainly because these offices 
are close to bank or organization headquarters, and not because many of 
them are in markets with a large share of organization deposits.26 Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  25
 V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
MULTI-MARKET BANKING
The main finding of this article is that slower economic growth caused 
small business lending to fall less at subordinate offices than primary offices 
during the 2000-03 recession and recovery. The discussion in Section II 
of the possible effects of multi-market banking on local lending behavior 
suggests three possible explanations for this result. The first two explana-
tions imply that multi-market banking has substantial economic benefits, 
but the third implies that multi-market banking may have some economic 
table 3
dIffERENCE  IN  gROWTH  Of  dEPOSITS  ANd  SMALL 
BUSINESS LOAN ORIgINATIONS, 2000-2003 
Markets with high job growth vs. markets with low job growth











1) Subordinate banking offices   6.6  2.0***  0.2
2) Primary banking offices     
a) Located in same market as bank  
or org. Hq and in market with   6.0  1.1  6.4*** 
less than half of org. deposits 
b) Located in same market as bank  
or org. Hq and in market with  6.2  1.0  5.7*** 
more than half of org. deposits  
Differences in differences
2b) minus 2a): effect of  greater 
share of org. deposits     -0.2  -0.7
2a) minus 1): effect of greater 
proximity to headquarters    -0.8  6.2***
2b) minus 1): effect of greater  
share of org. deposits and greater    -1.0  5.5***  
proximity to headquarters
Note: Subordinate banking offices are offices located in a different market than both bank and orga-
nization headquarters and in a market accounting for less than half of the organization’s total deposits. 
Primary offices are all other offices. growth rates are calculated as in Table 2.
* Significant at 10 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
***Significant at 1 percent level 
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costs. This section reviews the three possible explanations for the article’s 
main finding and argues that the evidence at the end of the previous sec-
tion supports the less benign explanation.
The first possible explanation for the unresponsiveness of small busi-
ness lending at subordinate offices is that multi-market banks are better 
able to cope with local supply-side shocks. According to this view, de-
creases in local deposits or reductions in capital due to local loan losses 
need not force banks operating mainly in other markets to cut back on 
lending. The reason is that these banks can shift funds from the other 
markets or raise funds on the capital markets. If this explanation for the 
article’s main result were correct, a shift to multi-market banking would 
benefit both the national economy and local communities. The alloca-
tion of credit in the economy would be improved, because businesses 
with  profitable  investment  opportunities  would  continue  to  receive 
credit in markets experiencing declines in deposits or bank capital. Local 
communities would also benefit, because the greater stability of bank 
lending would lead to greater stability in local economic activity.
The second possible explanation for the unresponsiveness of small 
business lending at subordinate offices is that multi-market banks are 
better able to tolerate an increase in the risk of local lending. When a 
market experiences an economic downturn, the profits from lending 
to small businesses in that market may become more variable. Banks 
with widely dispersed operations will be less concerned about such an 
increase in local lending risk and thus less disposed to cut back lending 
in the market. Like the first explanation, this explanation suggests that 
a shift to multi-market banking would be beneficial. The allocation of 
credit would be more closely tied to the expected profitability of lend-
ing in each market, and local communities would be less subject to 
destabilizing changes in bank lending.
The last possible explanation for the unresponsiveness of small busi-
ness lending at subordinate offices is less benign. According to this story, 
offices far removed from bank headquarters are either unable to detect 
changes in the creditworthiness of local borrowers, or not allowed to 
use such information in making loan decisions. To be sure, setting uni-
form lending policies based on hard information could make sense for a 
widely dispersed banking organization. Such an approach might reduce 
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branches act in the bank’s interests. If the reduction in costs were great 
enough, such a lending strategy could even increase the total supply of 
credit to small businesses. Nevertheless, this last explanation for the un-
responsiveness of small business lending at subordinate offices suggests a 
possible cost of multi-market banking. Specifically, when a demand-side 
shock reduces the expected profitability of lending in a market, lending 
may not fall as much as it should, because multi-market banks operating 
there either fail to recognize or fail to respond to the shock. 
Which of these three stories is correct? Although this article can-
not provide a definitive answer, the evidence presented at the end of the 
previous section provides some support for the last explanation. The first 
two explanations are based on the idea that subordinate offices benefit 
from belonging to geographically diversified banking organizations. Ac-
cording to both these stories, the main factor affecting the response of 
local lending to local economic shocks should be the share of the market 
in the organization’s total operations. If an office is located in a market 
accounting for a small share of total operations, the office should be bet-
ter able to draw on the support of offices in other markets in the event 
of an adverse supply shock. And if lending risk increases in the market, 
the parent organization should be more willing to allow the office to 
continue lending, because losses in that market can be offset by profits in 
other markets. But Table 3 showed that the main reason lending is more 
responsive to local economic conditions at primary offices than subordi-
nate offices is not because primary offices are more likely to be located in 
markets representing a large share of the organization’s total operations. 
Instead, the greater responsiveness of lending at primary offices is due to 
the fact that these offices, unlike subordinate offices, tend to be located 
in the same market as bank or organization headquarters. This evidence 
is more consistent with the last of the three stories, which predicts that 
offices located close to bank or organization headquarters will be better 
able to identify and respond to adverse demand shocks. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
The rapid pace of bank mergers over the last two decades has led 
to a substantial increase in the importance of multi-market banking 
organizations. A key question is how this phenomenon has affected 
the sensitivity of local bank lending to local economic shocks. This 28  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
question has been discussed on a theoretical level but has not been the 
subject of extensive empirical study due to the unavailability of data on 
bank lending at the local level. This article helps remedy this deficiency 
by using new data associated with the Community Reinvestment Act 
to examine local lending to small businesses during the 2001 recession 
and recovery. 
The basic approach of the article is to compare the effect of slower 
economic growth on small business lending at two types of banking 
offices—primary and subordinate. Primary offices are those located in 
the same market as bank or organization headquarters or in a mar-
ket accounting for a major share of the organization’s total operations. 
These offices are the offices that dominated the U.S. banking system 
before the advent of multi-market banking. Subordinate offices are 
those located in the same market as bank and organization headquar-
ters and in a market accounting for a small share of the organization’s 
total operations. These are the offices that have grown most rapidly as 
multi-market banking has spread.
The main finding of the article is that slow growth in the local 
economy reduced small business lending at primary offices but not 
subordinate offices. This finding supports the view that multi-market 
banking is reducing the sensitivity of local lending to local economic 
shocks. In principle, the unresponsiveness of local lending at subor-
dinate offices could reflect the greater ability of multi-office banks to 
offset local shocks to deposits and bank capital. Or it could reflect a 
greater tolerance of multi-market banks for increases in local lending 
risk. In either case, the implications of multi-market banking would 
be favorable both for the allocation of credit across markets and the 
stability of local economic activity. However, the unresponsiveness of 
local lending at subordinate offices could also reflect an inability of 
multi-office banks to detect or respond to changes in credit conditions 
in distant markets. In that case, multi-market banking could end up 
distorting the allocation of credit across markets. In support of the last 
explanation, this article found that proximity to bank or organization 
headquarters was the main reason for the difference in lending behav-
ior between primary and subordinate offices. given the importance of 
the issue, however, further research is clearly warranted. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  29
APPENdIX
This appendix explains how the CRA originations data were adjust-
ed to correct for various factors that could distort growth in reported 
originations. The first potential distortion is from smaller banks and 
thrifts growing and passing the $250 million size threshold for CRA 
reporters. Such an increase in the number of reporters would artificially 
boost measured growth in originations. The second distortion is from 
CRA reporters acquiring institutions that were originating small business 
loans before the merger but were not large enough to be reporters. Such 
acquisitions would also artificially boost growth in originations, because 
the originations of the acquired offices would only be included in the 
data after the merger.27 The last potential distortion is from mergers be-
tween institutions that are both CRA reporters. Such mergers would not 
affect total growth in originations, but they could distort relative growth 
in originations at primary and secondary banking offices by shifting re-
ported originations from one type of office to the other.28 
To adjust the originations data for these potential distortions, it 
was first necessary to estimate small business loan originations by mar-
ket for each non-reporter that was acquired by a reporter in the next 
year and for each non-reporter that became a reporter in the next year. 
These estimates were derived in three steps from bank-level data on 
small business loans outstanding and branch-level data on deposits. In 
the first step, bank-level data for CRA reporters with less than $1 bil-
lion in assets were used to estimate the average relationship of origina-
tions to deposits, small business loans outstanding in the current year, 
and small business loans outstanding in the previous year. In the second 
step, branch-level data for the same group of reporters were used to 
estimate the average relationship between CRA originations and de-
posits. finally, the results from the first two steps were combined with 
data on non-reporters’ small business loans outstanding and deposits to 
estimate their small business loan originations in each market.29 
After small business loan originations were estimated for non-re-
porters, the originations data were adjusted for mergers. Specifically, 
for each acquisition by a CRA reporter—whether of a reporter or of a 
non-reporter—the originations of the acquired bank in the year before 
the merger were added to the originations of the acquiring bank in 30  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
that year. Reporters’ current and previous-year originations were then 
summed by market and type of banking office in the current year (sub-
ordinate vs. primary), so that year-to-year growth in originations could 
be calculated for each market and type of banking office.30 
Even with the adjustments described above, growth in originations 
could be distorted by changes in reporting requirements. Of most con-
cern for this study was the decision in 2001 to allow reporters to treat 
renewals of small business loans (extensions of maturity) the same way 
as refinancings—i.e., to include them in originations (federal finan-
cial Institutions Examination Council 2002, Hannan). Such reporting 
changes could have a significant effect on overall growth in origina-
tions. However, they should not distort comparisons of growth at dif-
ferent types of banks in a particular year, as long as they affect all banks 
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ENdNOTES
1See Johnson and Rice for a comprehensive explanation of the Riegle-Neal 
Act and its impact on interstate branching.
2In mid-2007, the 361 metro areas in the U.S. accounted for 88.5 percent 
of total deposits. 
3Morgan and others find evidence that the geographic deregulation of bank-
ing led to a decrease in state-level business cycle volatility and attribute this change 
to the ability of large, geographically diversified organizations to withstand local 
shocks that decrease bank capital. Similarly, Becker finds that geographic deregu-
lation reduced the responsiveness of bank lending to differences in local deposits 
due to demographic factors—specifically, differences across markets in the per-
centage of elderly. finally, a number of studies of multi-bank holding companies 
(MBHCs) support the view that these companies serve as a source of liquidity 
and capital to their subsidiaries. for example, Houston and others found that the 
lending of banks belonging to MBHCs depends more on the capital and cash flow 
of the holding company than the capital and cash flow of the bank, while Holod 
and Peek found that MBHCs use both capital transfers and loan sales to re-allo-
cate funds from subsidiaries with high capital to subsidiaries with low capital. In 
another set of studies, Ashcraft, Campello, and Huang all found that a tightening 
of monetary policy led to greater decreases in lending at stand-alone banks than 
at banks with similar characteristics belonging to MBHCs.
4A few studies have found evidence that banks belonging to MBHCs are 
more likely than stand-alone banks to decrease lending in response to decreases in 
local demand. Houston and James found that lending by subsidiaries of MBHCs 
was more responsive than lending by stand-alone banks to changes in overall loan 
growth in the state. Huang found that a tightening of monetary policy caused a 
bigger reduction in bank lending in counties that were dependent on manufactur-
ing (counties in which tighter monetary policy could be expected to cause bigger 
declines in loan demand), and that lending in these counties declined significantly 
more at banks belonging to MBHCs than at stand-alone banks.
5for evidence that small businesses can increase their access to credit or 
smooth their borrowing costs by forming long-term relationships with banks, see 
Petersen and Rajan and Berlin and Mester.
6Hughes and others (1996, 1999) found that the expansion of banks across 
state lines improved their risk-return tradeoff, reducing the variance of total prof-
its associated with each expected level of total profits.
7Stein argues that large hierarchical banks do not rely on soft information 
because loan officers in such banks do not have enough incentive to invest in such 
information—their investment could end up being wasted, because top man-
agement might not provide the funds needed to act on the information. Berger 
and Udell suggest that economies of scale give large banks a strong comparative 32  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
advantage in transactions-based lending, and that it is inefficient for large banks 
to engage in both transaction-based lending and relationship lending. Berger and 
others find evidence consistent with the view that large banks rely less than small 
banks on soft information and relationship lending. 
8Canales and Randa argue that decentralized banking offices with authority 
to make loan decisions are more likely to collect information about the local mar-
ket and use that information to their advantage than centralized banking offices 
that do not enjoy such autonomy. In support of this point, they show that in the 
Mexican banking system, decentralized branches tend to charge higher loan rates 
than centralized branches in highly concentrated markets.
9Multi-market banks are likely to have an especially difficult time monitoring 
offices when those offices are located at a large distance from organization head-
quarters. Consistent with this view, Berger and deyoung found that the ability of 
MBHCs to exercise control over their subsidiaries decreased with the distance of 
the subsidiary from the lead bank, though they also found that the adverse effect 
of distance on control had diminished somewhat over time.
10This change became effective for thrifts in 2004 and for commercial banks 
in 2005. The $1 billion size threshold was also indexed to the price level, so that 
the threshold would automatically increase with inflation. 
11Purchases of small business loans must also be reported, but these tend to 
be much smaller than originations. In 2003, for example, purchases were only 2 
percent of originations. The CRA data are also broken down by the size of the loan 
(under $100,000; $100,000 to $250,000; and $250,000 to $1 million) and by the 
gross annual revenues of the borrower (less than or greater than $1 million). 
12While there is no exact relationship between the size of the loan and the 
size of the borrower, surveys have shown a strong correlation between the two 
(keeton). According to the 2003 Survey of Small Business finances, 96.5 percent 
of credit line extensions to small businesses were associated with commitments of 
$1 million or less (Board of governors 2007, p. 39). 
13Independent data from bank call reports suggest that the amounts of the 
two types of small business loans were of similar magnitude in 2001 (Board of 
governors 2002). A substantial portion of the small loans backed by nonresiden-
tial real estate are backed by owner-occupied real estate (e.g., factories or stores), 
making them more similar to C&I loans than to commercial real estate loans 
(Mortgage Bankers Association). 
14for example, Helfand and others report that businesses with less than 100 
employees accounted for only 20 percent of the average quarterly decline in net 
employment during the 2001 recession and recovery, versus 60 percent during 
the 1990-1991 recession and recovery. 
15As noted earlier, the CRA data on small business loan originations combine 
small C&I loans with small loans secured by nonresidential real estate. growth Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  33
in small nonresidential real estate loans also declined after 2000, though by much 
less than growth in small C&I loans. 
16Some loan originations are by banking organizations that have no offices in 
the market in which the loans are made. Such “non-local” lending is not covered 
by this article but is examined in detail in Hannan and Laderman. 
17year-over-year growth in small business loan originations is highly volatile, 
even after making the adjustments described in the appendix. As a result, the 
data were trimmed by computing the year-over-year growth rate for each bank, 
market, and year and dropping observations falling in either the top or bottom 
decile.
18for example, annual nonfarm employment peaked in 2000 and returned to 
approximately the same level in 2004.
19following common practice, growth in employment, loan originations, 
and deposits are all measured in log terms in this article—specifically, as 100 
times the difference in log levels.
20If the year-over-year growth in originations was missing for any of these 
years, that market/type combination was dropped from the data.
21for example, Table 2 indicates that the growth of deposits and originations 
in primary banking offices could be computed for 116 high-growth markets and 
132 low-growth markets.
22All significance levels are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White-
Eicker method.
23The difference-in-differences for primary and subordinate offices was 4.3 
percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. for this 
exercise, a different set of 248 metro areas had to be constructed. This was neces-
sary because the Census data on employment by size of firm are only reported for 
metro areas, and because the 2000-2002 employment data are based on the 1999 
metro-area definitions rather than the new 2003 metro-area definitions.
24In 2000, 35.8 percent of primary office deposits were in the first type of office 
and 62.0 percent in the second type. The remaining 2.3 percent of primary office 
deposits were in offices located in a different market than bank and organization 
headquarters but in a market with more than half of organization deposits. 
25As indicated in Table 3, the difference-in-differences for this case is 6.2 
percentage points, which is significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, the 
difference-in-differences for the two types of primary office is -0.7 percentage 
points, which is statistically insignificant.
26An additional issue is whether proximity to bank headquarters or proximity 
to organization headquarters is the more important factor affecting the responsive-
ness of  local lending to local economic shocks. This question is beyond the scope 
of the current article, but differences-in-differences tests similar to those in Table 3 
suggest that proximity to bank headquarters is the more important factor. 34  FeDeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
27The combined effect of the first two distortions, both of which result from 
the existence of a size threshold for reporters, was to reduce the average annual 
growth in originations during 2000-2003 by 2.1 percentage points.
28Suppose, for example, that a reporter based in kansas City and operating 
primarily in that market was acquired in 2001 by another reporter based in a dif-
ferent market and operating primarily outside of kansas City. If the data were not 
adjusted for the merger, the first bank’s originations in the kansas City market 
would be included with those of other primary offices in 2000, but with those 
of subordinate offices in 2001. Thus, in the kansas City market, the effect of 
the merger would be to artificially decrease 2000-2001 growth in primary-office 
originations  and  artificially  increase  2000-2001  growth  in  subordinate-office 
originations.
29for other studies that use bank-level call report data and branch-level de-
posit and CRA data to estimate originations by market for non-reporters, see 
Hannan and Laderman.
30In a few cases, offices located in the same market in which the bank was 
headquartered operated alongside offices of a bank belonging to the same orga-
nization but headquartered in a different market. In such cases, both groups of 
offices were classified as being in the same market as bank headquarters if the first 
group held more deposits and as being in a different market than bank headquar-
ters if the second group held more deposits.Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  35
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